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The Supreme Court of Kansas has accepted the doctrine
that a child adopted in a sister state, in substantial compliance
with its statutes, will inherit lands of the deceased
Adoption,
Rights of
adopting parent in the state of the latter's domicile
Child
Adopted,
on equal terms with a child of the parent born in
Descent
wedlock; and holds that the heirs of an adopted
child will inherit, through him, a share of the estate of the
deceased adopting parent, just as if he were a child of that
parent by blood: Gray v. Hohnes, 45 Pac. Rep. 596.
The adoption of a child in one state will confer upon it the
rights of a child born in wedlock, as to inheritance from its
adopting parents, not only in the state of adoption, but also in
all other states, unless the laws of the latter preclude such a
result: Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 1893; Ross v.
Ross, 129 Mass. 243, I88O; Melvin v. Martin, 18 R. I. 650,
1894. But adoption will not confer the right of inheritance
from collaterals, if contrary to the laws of the state where the
property is situate: Keegan v. Geraglgty, IoI Ill. 26, 1881.
When an attorney has come from another state to attend to
business of his clients then pending in court, service of a subpcena upon him, to attend hearings as a witness,
Attorney,
Privilege, before he has had a reasonable time to take his
Service
departure, will be set aside, on his motion, as a
of ubpna violation of the protection which the law extends
to all necessarily attending upon a court, especially when the
business of his client requires his immediate presence in other
states: Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Co.,
(Circuit Court, E. D. Wisconsin,) 74 Fed. Rep. 442.
The proprietor of a theatre is not the bailee of the overcoat
a patron, who hangs it on a hook in a box
Balent, ofof
Proprietorof occupied by him while witnessing a play: PattiTheatre
son v. Hammerstein, (Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Term, First Department,) 39 N. Y. Suppl.
1039.
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According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Michigan, mandamus will issue to compel a board
Board of
Health,
of health to award compensation to one whose
Compensation
for Property
Destroyed

property it has occupied or destroyed to prevent
the spread of contagious disease, when it refuses

to do so: Safford v. Board of Health of City of Detroit, 67 N.
W. Rep. 1094.

Certiorari will not lie to review the decision of a political
organization as to the election of its officers purCertiorari,
Decislon of suant to the provisions of its constitution, as such
Political
Oranization

an organization is not a judicial body: Peo. v.
Lauterbach, (Supreme Court of New York, Appel-

late Division,.First Department,) 39 N. Y. Suppl. I117.
A contract by a person to communicate information oft
terms of getting a share of any property that may thereby be
recovered by the person to whom the information.
Champerty,
Unclaimed
is to be given, and nothing more, is not void for
Property,

Secret
Information

champerty.

But if the contract be not merely

that information shall given, but also that the

person who gives it and who is to share in what may be
recovered, shall himself recover the property, or actively assist
in the recovery of it, then the contract is against the policy of
the law, and void, even if the property is in the hands of
trustees, or in court, and no hostile action may be necessary
to recover it: Rees v. DeBernardy,(Chancery Division, Romer,
J.,) [1896]

2

Ch. 437.

In In re Chadwick, 67 N. W. Rep. 1071, the Supreme Court
of Michigan has laid down some elementary principles of law
Contempt,
Imputation of

with regard to the liability of an attorney for con-

official

tempt in criticising the action of the court in
reference to a cause before it which will bear

Judge,
Purgation

repeating. It holds:
(I) That in a proceeding for contempt in writ-

Miisconduct to

ing a letter criticising the action of the court in rendering a
certain decree, it is no defence that the case was not pending
when the letter was written, if the decree was still open to
modification, rehearing, or appeal;
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That a letter criticising a decree, and charging the
judge with unfairness or improper conduct, is an attack upon
the official conduct of the judge constituting a contempt;
and,
(3) That a disavowal of an intent to charge improper conduct on the part of the judge will purge the defendant of
contempt only when the language used admits of two interpretations; if but one interpretation is possible, the disavowal
is of no avail.
(2)

In In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., (No. 2,) [1896] 2 Ch. 279,
it appeared that for some years before a company was wound
Corporations, up, balance-sheets signed by the auditors were pubOfficers,
lished by the directors to the stockholders, in which
Auditors,

the value of the company's stock-in-tfade at the
end of each year was grossly overstated. The auditors relied
on certificates, wilfully false, given by one of the directors, who
was a:lso nianager, and a man of great business ability and
high repute, as to the value of the s-ock-in-trade. Dividends
were paid for some years on the supposition that the balancesheets were correct; but if the stock-in-trade had been stated
at its true value, it would have appeared that there were no
profits out of which a dividend. could be declared. If the
auditors had compared the different books and added to the
stock-in-trade at the beginning of the year the amounts purchased during the year, and deducted the amounts sold, they
would have seen that the statement of the stock-in-trade at
the end of the year was so large as to call for explanation;
but they did not do so.
On winding-up, the liquidator
sought to charge the auditors with the amount of the dividends improperly paid, on the ground that they had been
guilty of misfeasance. This contention was upheld by the
court below, (Vaughan Williams, J., [1896] I Ch. 331,) but
his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which held
that an auditor is not bound to be suspicious where there are
no circumstances to arouse suspicion; he is only bound to
exercise a reasonable amount of care and skill; and that as
it was no part of the duty of the auditors to take an account
Misfeasance
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of stock, they were justified in relying on the certificates of
the manager, in view of his reputation in the business world,
and were not bound to check his certificates in the absence of
anything to raise suspicion; and that consequently they were
not liable for the dividends wrongfully paid.
The Court of Chancery Appeals of Tenne~see has decided
a rather peculiar question arising out of a deed. The owner
Deed,
Reservation
of Rooms,
Rights o
Grantor on
Destruction
of Building

of a lot and a brick house partly built thereon,
sold and conveyed the same, in consideration " of
six hundred dollars to me satisfactorily arranged,"
the deed expressly providing, however, that the

grantor "is to complete said house and have cut
off of the front on north end of said building, upstairs, twentyeight feet, and divided into offices, as may be directed by said
W. J. Leonard, [the grantor,] and keep the same in reasonable repair for his use, which twenty-eight feet upstairs in said
building is not transferred by this deed, but the absolute title
to same is retained, and the building of the same is a part of
the purchase consideration for said house and lot." The
grantee completed the house, and the grantor went into possession of the offices. The building was afterwards destroyed
by fire, and in rebuilding, the claim of the grantor to office
rooms such as those reserved in the deed was ignored. He
then brought suit to determine his interest under the deed.
It was held, that the consideration named in the deed was
fully paid by the completion of the original offices, and that
consequently the grantor had no claim which he could enforce
as a vendor's lien; that as the deed contained no covenant to
rebuild, the grantee fulfilled his contract so long as he kept
the existing offices in reasonable repair; and that the contract
in the deed was, in legal effect, simply a lease of the offices
without further rent as long as the building existed, and after
its destruction the lessee had no property in the brick which
had inclosed the particular rooms occupied by him, but the
material which remained after the fire belonged to the owner
of the lot as a part of the building: Leonard v. Read, 36
S. W. Rep. 581.
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In an ordinary commercial document the word "discount"
means rebate of interest, and not "true" or
Discount
mathematical discount : In re Land Securities Co.,
(Court of Appeal,) [1896] 2 Ch. 320.

A bill in equity against the holder of a nofe to recover
possession of it, and against the makers for the balance due
thereon, may be maintained pending an action at
-Election of
law against the holders and makers to recover
Remedies,
Different
from the makers the balance due on it; and a
Relief
judgment in the latter action,
denying recovery on
the ground that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the
note, and that their rights thereto, as against the holder, could
not be tried in that action, will not bar a bill in equity for the
former purpose: Cobb v. Fogg, (Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts,) 44 N. E. Rep. 534.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has recently decided a
curious question as to the apportionment of interest on a
mortgage between a present and expectant life
Estates,
Present and estate.
The plaintiff owned a present life estate,
Expectant
in the remainder, subject to an expecfee
the
Life Estates, and
Apportiontant life estate in the defendant, contingent on the
ment of

Interest on
Mortgage

plaintiff's death. The defendant's life estate and
the fee were subject to a mortgage purchased

by the plaintiff, who sued the defendant for interest. It
was held that the latter was liable to the plaintiff for a share
of the interest on the mortgage debt due or to become due
during the expectancy, proportionate to the relative values of
their estates; that upon the vesting of the life estate in the
defendant she would become liable for the whole of the
interest; and that the amount of the present payment of it
should be computed upon the basis of the expectancy of life
of both plaintiff and defendant: Damm v. Damin, 67 N. W.
Rep. 984.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Vermont, the
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"general
Evidence,
General
Reputation,
Proof of
Death

reputation in the family," which is admissible in
matters of pedigree, or to establish the facts of
birth, marriage, or death, is confined to declarations of deceased members of the family, and
family history and traditions handed down by

declarations of deceased members, in either case made ante
litem motam, and originating with persons presumed to have
competent knowledge of the facts stated; and evidence of the
opinion or belief of living members of a family as to the death
of another member, or of general reputation among a person's
living friends and acquaintances as to his death, is not within
the rule, and is inadmissible: In re Hurlburt'sEstate, 35 Atl.
Rep. 77.

When the identity of a building as such has been
destroyed by fire, it is a total loss, though some of its materials have not been entirely destroyed; and if
Insurance,
Total Loss
these facts are undisputed, the court may properly
instruct that the loss is total: Lindner v. St. Paul F. & Lf
Ins. Co., (Supreme Court of Wisconsin,) 67 N. W. Rep.
1125.

To the same effect are Williams v. Hari/ord Ins. Co., 54
Cal. 442, 188o; German Ins. Co. of Freeportv.Eddy, 36 Neb.
461, 1893; Ins. Co. of North America v. Backler, (Neb.) 62
N. W. Rep. 91 1, 1895 ; Seyk v. Millers' Nat?. Ins. Co., 74 Wis.
72, 1889.
An accident which cuts off all the fingers and half the
palm of the hand, leaving only the thumb and a portion of
the palm, causes a " total loss " of the hand: Sneck v. Tral,ellers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 545, 1895, overruling 3o N. Y. Suppl. 881, 1894; See Lord v. American
Mut. Ace. Assn. (Wis.), 61 N. W. Rep. 293, 1895.
When an insurance is effected on charter profits, and in
consequence of accident the total amount of freights payable
is less than the charter freights, there is a " total loss" of the
profits: Asfar v. Blundell, [1896] I Q. B. 123, 1895, affirming
[1895] 2 Q. B. 196, 1895.
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The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, has lately
ruled, that an accident insurance policy, which provides that it
shall not cover injuries or death "resulting from,
Accident

Insurance,
Construction
of Policy

or caused, directly or indirectly, wholly or in
part, by . . . . walking or being on a rail,way
bridge or roadbed," is not
to be construed

with absolute literalness, and does not bind the insured not to
cross a railroad, on a public thoroughfare, at a place provided
for the public to cross it, on pain of losing his right to
recover; and, consequently, that one who is struck and injured
or killed while crossing a railroad at such a crossing, can
recover under such a policy : Traders' & Travellers' Acc. Co.
of N. Y.v. Wagley, 74 Fed. Rep. 457.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently decided a
very interesting point of accident insurance law. The plaintiff in the case was a signalman in the employment
Accident
Insurance,
Fright

of the defendant railway company, which entered

into a contract of insurance with him, agreeing to

pay him a weekly allowance in case he should be incapaci.
tated from employment by reason of accident sustained in
discharge of his duty in the company's service. This insurance was to be absolute for all accidents, however caused,
occurring to the insured in the fair and ordinary discharge of
his duty. In the discharge of his duty the plaintiff endeavored to prevent an accident to a train by signalling the engineer, and the excitement and fright arising from the danger to
the train produced a nervous shock which incapacitated him
from employment. He then brought suit against the
company for the weekly allowance, and was permitted to
recover, on the ground that he had been incapacitated by
accident, within the meaning of the policy: Pugh v. London,
Brighton & South Coast Ry. Co., [1896] 2 Q. B. 248.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of N. Y v. Waterman, 44 N. E. Rep. 283, affirming 59 Ill.
App. 297, has decided, that an accidental asphyxiaDeath from
inhaling as tion by illuminating gas which escaped into the

room where the assured slept, is not within a
clause in an accident policy providing that "this insurance
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does not cover . .. injuries, fatal or otherwise, resulting from
poison or anything accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed, or inhaled." In reply to the contention that
this construction was to make a new contract between the
parties, the court observed that it was without merit, since
years before the policy was issued the Court of Appeals of
New York, where the policy was issued, had decided that
accidental asphyxiation was not within a clause exempting
the insurer from liability for injuries caused by taking poison
or inhaling gases, and the policy in question must be understood
to have been made with knowledge of that decision and its
effect.
The case referred to was Paul v. Travellers' Ins. Co., I 12
N. Y. 472, 1889, reversing 22 Hun, 187, where it was held
that a policy providing that " this insurance shall not extend
. ... to any death or disability which may have been
caused . . . . by the taking of poison, contact with poisonous
substances, or inhaling of gas," did not prevent a recovery
when the insured was found dead in bed in his room at a
hotel, with the gas turned on, and the atmosphere of the room
filled with it, it being found that the death was caused by
breathing the vitiated air, and "by accidental means." This
was followed in Pickett v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 Pa.
79, 189i, where the plaintiffs intestate was insured by a
policy which provided that "this insurance shall not cover
.....
death or injury resulting from or attributable partially
or wholly to ..... .taking
of poison, contact with poisonous
substances, inhalation of gas," etc. He went down into a well
only ten or twelve feet deep, to fix the pump, and was asphyxiated by "the accidental and unconscious inhalation of carbonic
acid or other deadly gas that had unexpectedly accumulated;
and the administrator was allowed to recover.
The most recent case on the subject, until now, was Menneiley v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 148 N. Y. 596,
(1896,) reversing 72 Hun, 477; where the policy provided
that it did not "insure against death or disablement arising
rom anything accidentally taken, administeredor inhaled, contact of poisonous substance, inhaling gas," etc. The deceased
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was found dead in bed, with his room filled with illuminating
gas, just as in the Paul case; the agreed statement of
facts set out that his death was caused by accidentally breathing gas; and the death was held not to be within the exception in the policy. The clause in italics was thus construed
by the court: "That provision in the policy clearly implies
voluntary action on the part of the insured or some other
person. The insured must take or inhale or another must
administer. The manifest purpose of the provision is to
exempt the insurer from liability where the insured has voluntarily and consciously, but accidentally, taken or inhaled, or
something has been voluntarily administered which was injurious or destructive' of life. We think that the particular
accidents intended to be excepted by that provision are the
accidental taking or inhaling into the system of some injurious
or destructive agency under the mistaken belief that it was
beneficial, or, at least, harmless. That is made more apparent
by that portion of the provision which relates to something
administered, as it cannot be reasonably construed as referring
to a thing involuntarily and unconsciously administered.
Indeed, it is quite difficult to understand how a thing could
be involuntarily and unconsciously administered. Coupled
together as these provisions are, the same rule of construction
must be applied to that portion which relates to a substance
accidentally taken or accidentally administerea. All the cases
thus provided for plainly involve voluntary and conscious
action on the part of the insured or some other person. The
leading and controlling idea in this provision is the performance of a voluntary act which accidentally causes the death or
injury of the insured. That a proper construction of the
policy requires us to hold that it applies only to cases where
something has been voluntarily and intentionally, although
mistakenly, taken, administered, or inhaled, there can, we
think, be but little doubt."
These cases also hold that such a death is not within the
exception of the policy providing that it does not insure against
death, disablement or injury "from accidents that shall bear
no external and visible marks," construing that provision to
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mean, not that the accident must leave external and visible
marks on the body of the deceased, but that it is sufficient if
there are any perceptible signs of the cause of the accident to
be found in'the vicinity, such as the presence of gas.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota has lately had before it
several cases involving the construction of a credit insurance
policy. This policy insured the plaintiffs against
Credit
Insurance,of excess losses caused by the failure or insolvency
Insolvency
Insurer,
of customers to whom they had made sales. on
Recovery of
Unearned
Premiums,
Proof of Loss

credit, these losses to be ascertained by deducting
from the total losses fifteen per cent. thereof and
also one per cent. of the total year's sales, to

be not less than a stipulated amount. One plaintiff took out
such a policy for one year, in which it was stipulated that the
year's sales on which the one per cent. was to be computed
should not be less than $9o,ooo. After the policy had run a
trifle over ten months the insurer became insolvent, and
assigned for the benefit of creditors, which was held to
terminate the policy. During the life of the policy, the total
amount of sales was $75,ooo; and it was held, that for the
purpose of estimating the excess loss, the one per cent. should
be computed on this amount, and not on the $9o,ooo. Another
plaintiff took ouf a policy, but did not suffer during its life
enough loss to enable him to recover; and it was decided that
he could not recover for losses subsequent to the assignment.
A third policy ran for the full year, and the assignment was
made nine days after it expired. By its terms the insured was
barred from recovery unless it made final proof of the year's
losses within thirty days after the expiration of the year, which
it failed to do, but it was held that the assignment was a
breach of the contract, and that the insured could recover
on a quantum neruit without furnishing proofs of loss. It
was also held that when the policy had not expired, the insured
could recover-back the unearned premium for the balance of
the year after the assignment; but not the whole of the premium paid, though he had suffered no loss during the life of
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Smitl v. Natl. Credit Ins. Co., 68 N. W.

Rep. 28.

In Mascott v. Granite State Fire Insurance Co., 35 Atl. Rep.
.75, the Supreme Court of Vermont has recently passed upon
some very interesting questions arising under a
Insuranace,
policy of fire insurance, holding that when the
Fire,
policy provided for an insurance on "paints, oils,
Policy,
Construction,

Parol
Evidence

varnishes, leather, rubber and enameled cloth,
broadcloth, carriage tops, backs, dusters and

cushions, paint mill, tools, letter patterns, and such other
articles as are usually kept in a sign painter's and carriage
painter's and trimmer's shop," parol evidence was admissible
to amplify the clause, and show what articles are thus usually
kept; that when there is a repugnancy between a typewritten rider on a policy and the printed parts of the policy,
the provisions of the rider will prevail; and that, therefore,
when a type-written rider provided for insurance on such articles as are usually kept in a painter's shop, as above, while a
printed stipulation in the body of the policy provided that
" this entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement
hereon, or added hereto, shall be void . . . . if, (any
usage or custom of trade or manufacture to the contrary notwithstanding,) there be kept, used, or allowed, on the abovedescribed premises, benzine," etc., and it was shown that benzine was usually kept in a shop such as that maintained by
the insured, the prohibition of keeping benzine applied only
when that article was not insured, and by insuring it, per
the rider, it was " otherwise provided, by agreement indorsed upon the policy," that benzine might be kept on the
premises.
Under a contract of life insurance issued by a mutual company, conditioned that it shall be subject to any
by-law thereafter enacted, the insured is bound
by a subsequent by-law, forfeiting the policy if
the insured dies by his own hand: Daugzhtry v. Knights of
Pythias, (Supreme Court of Louisiana,) 20 So. Rep. 712.
Lifeinsurance'
M1utuai,
By-Laws,
Suicide,
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According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, if the plaintiff in an action brought
Joint
Obligation,
upon a joint contract obligation elects to enter
Judgment
Against One

Defendant,
Merger of

judgment against one of the defendants upon his
default to plead or answer, that judgment is a bar

to a subsequent action against the other, since the
debt is merged in the judgment: Davison v. Harmon, 67 N.
W. Rep. 1015.
Debt

The publication in a newspaper of a false accusation against a
man, though based upon information giving reasonable ground
for belief in its truth, is not justified by the fact
Libel,
that the man against whom the charge is made is
Privilege,
Candidate for an applicant for a federal office, to be filled by the
Office

president, and is not privileged: George Knapp &
Co. v. Campbell, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,) 36 S. W.
Rep. 765.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has lately held, that the
publications of a commercial agency, issued on printed lists,
Privilege,
Mercantile

eports

and generally distributed among their subscribers,
are not privileged communications; and if they are
erroneous, and cause damage to any one, the

agency may be held liable: Giacona v. Bradstreet Co., 20 So.
Rep. 7o6.

According to a recent ruling of the Chief Justice of England, the possessor of land is generally entitled to chattels
LostProperty, found thereon, as against the finder; and, therefore, when one found two rings while cleaning out
Rights of
Finder and
OwnerofLand a pool of water on the land of a corporation,
where Found under its orders, and declined to deliver them to
the latter, but failed to find the real owner, the corporation
was held entitled to recover the rings in an action of detinue:
South Staffordshire Water Co. v Sharman, [1896] 2 Q. B. 44.
The general rule as to the right to the possession of lost
property is, that the finder has a right to retain it as against
all but the rightful owner: Armoy v. Delamirie, I Stra. 504,
1722; Lawrence v. Buck, 62 Me. 275, 1874; Mffathlews v.
Harsell, i E. D. Smith, (N Y.) 393, 1852 ; Dutfec v. Jones,
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i i R. I. 588, 1877; Tancil v. Seaton, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 6oi,
1877.
Ordinarily the place of finding is immaterial. A servant
who finds property on his master's premises, as for instance, a
-conductor finding money or other property on the cars Ni.
Y & Harlem R. R. Co. v. Haws, 56 N. Y. 175, 1874; Tatum
v. Sharpless, 6 Phila. i8, x865.; an employe in a paper-mill,
who finds notes among old papers bought to be manufactured
over: Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281, 1878 ; or a servant in
a hotel, who finds money in the public parlor: Hamaker v.
Blauchard,9 ° Pa. 377; may retain it as against the master or
employer; and a fortion, a stranger who finds money in a
shop or other place may retain it as against the shop-owner:
Bridges v. Hawkes-wortz, 21 L. J. Q. B. 75, 1851 ; unless it
has been simply laid aside and left by mistake: McAvoy v.
ii Allen, Mass. 548, 1866; Loucks v. Gallogly, i
'fediita,
Misc. Rep. N. Y. 22, 1892.
This rule is, however, subject to an as yet ill-defined exception, which is thus laid down by the Chief Justice in the case
cited :
-Where a person has possession of house or land, with a
manifest intention to exercise control over it and the things
which may be upon or in it, then, if something is found on
that land, whether by an employe of the owner or by a
stranger, the presumption is that the possession of that thing
is in the owner of the locus in quo." This language applies
to land with respect to which the public has no easement which
differentiates the case from findings in shops and other public
places. The real distinction, however, is this, that those things
belong to the owner of the premises in which they are found,
which, either from their nature, or from the circumstances
attending the loss, become practically part and parcel of the
freehold, such as the rings, covered by the water and mud,
which undoubtedly belonged to the owner of the land, and the
aerolite in Goddard v. Wincltell, 86 Iowa, 7', 1892, which
buried itself in the ground to the depth of three feet; or, to use
the language of some of the cases, those things belong to the
owner which may be regarded as accretions to his land, such as
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the aerolite, the rings, or drift-logs; though the latter may be
pursued and taken by a former finder, from whom they have
escaped: Deaderick v. Oulds, 86 Tenn. 14, 1887.
If a finder attempts to retain lost property as against the
owner, or converts it to his own use, when he knows the
owner, he will be guilty of larceny: Lawrence v. State, i
Humph. (Tenn.) 228, 1839; Pritckett v. 'State, 2 Sneed,
(Tenn.) 285, 1854. See Porterv. State, Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.)
226, 1827.

In United States v. Fulkerson, (District Court, S. D. Cali-

fornia,) 74 Fed. Rep. 619, the defendants, under the name of
Lottery,

Insurance
Policies

the "United Indemnity Company," conducted a
business, the plan of which was essentially as follows: In consideration of a membership fee of'

five dollars and monthly dues of two dollars thereafter, it
entered into contracts with persons who desired to become
members, which purported to be contracts of indemnity in
case of sickness, accident, or death, and issued to them certificates, containing the usual provisions of similar insurance
policies. To each of these certificates were attached fifty
coupons of ten dollars each, numbered consecutively, those
on the first certificate issued running from I to 5o, those on
the second from 51 to ioo, and so on. The certificates
were issued in the order in which the applications were
received by mail or otherwise, and there was no means of
knowing, prior to the issue of a certificate, how many had
been issued previously, nor what would be the numbers of
the coupons to be attached to it. It was provided that onehalf of the amounts received from monthly dues should be
placed in a so-called " maturity fund," and that, whenever
there should be sufficient money in said fund to pay one or
more coupons, such number of coupons should be paid,
and that the coupons to be paid should be determined
by taking, first, the coupon numbered i, then that numbered 5,
and so on, in a geometrical progression, with the ratio 5,
until the series reached the highest numbered coupon sold;
then that numbered 2, then IO, etc., in a second series, with
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the same ratio, and so on, until the numbers of all the coupons
sold should be included in some series. It was also provided
that, at the end of three years, each certificate-holder should
receive the full amouut paid in monthly dues; at the end of
five years, $150; at the end of seven years, $3oo ; and at the
end of ten years, $5oo; but the only resources to provide for
these payments were the membership fees, and certain inconsiderable portions of the monthly dues,-the remainder of
these dues, after providing for the maturity fund, being
devoted to an expense fund, and a sick, accident, and death
fund. This whole scheme was accordingly held to be a
lottery, under Rev. Stat. U. S., § 3894.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the
motorman of an electric car and a track repairer
blaster and
are fellow-servants; and the latter cannot recover
Servant,
Fellow.
from the company operating the road for injuries
Servants

caused by the negligence of the former: Lundquist v. Dulut/h St. R. Co., 67 N. W. Rep. ioo6.
The Supreme Court of Vermont has lately held, that when
a contract under which an employer takes stone from a quarry
is for no definite period, and can be terminated
Discharge of
Servant,
Liability

at the pleasure of the superintendent of the quarry,
the latter is not liable to a servant of the employer,
whose discharge he procures by refusing to allow

the employer to take stone from the quarry unless he discharges him, if he does not act maliciously: Raycroft v.
Tayntor, 35 Atl. Rep. 53.
A captain of a company of the National Guard of a state
has no authority, when the company is not acting
Militia,
Authority
as a military force, to summarily punish with
Officers,
False

imprisonment a member of his company for a
Imprisonment refusal to obey his orders, unless that authority is
conferred by statute; and if he does so punish him, he will be
liable for false imprisonment: Vioyz v. Reeves, (Supreme
Court of Minnesota,) 67 N. W. Rep. 989.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

The Appellate Court of Indiana has recently adopted the
?Promissory Note, doctrine which holds that a note payable "with
Negotiability
exchange" is not negotiable:" Nicely v. Conmercial Bk. of Union City, 4 4 N. E. Rep. 572. (See note in
this issue of THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REvIw.)
The addition of "with exchange" or " current rate of
exchange," will render a note non-negotiable,'if it is to be paid
.at a different place: Saxton v. Stevenson, 23 U. C. C. P. 503,
1874; Hughitt v.Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865, 1886 ; Culbert-son v. Nelson, (Iowa,) 61 N. W. Rep. 854, 1895 ; Phila.Bk. v.
Newkirk, 2 Miles, (Pa.) 442, 184o; contra, Bradley v. Till,
.4 Biss. (U. S.) 473, 1867; Clauserv. Stone, 29 Ill. 114, 1862;
Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137, 1878; Orr v. Hopkins, 3 N.
M. 45, 1883; Whittle v. Fond Du Lac Natl. Bk., (Tex.) 26
S. W. Rep. i io6, 1894; but if it is to be paid in current coin,
there can be no exchange, and those words will be rejected as
surplusage, leaving the note negotiable: Hill v. Todd, 29 Ill.
oi, 1862 ; and if it is to be paid at the place where it is
drawn, there can also be no exchange, and the note is negotiable : Christian Co. Bk. v. Goode, 44 Mo. App. 129, 1891.
So, a note for the payment of a specified sum, with the
current rate of exchange on New York," or simply " with
exchange on New York," or elsewhere, is not negotiable, as.
the addition renders the sum payable uncertain: Palmer v.
Fahnestock, 9 U. C. C. P. 172, 186o; Nash v. Gibbon, 4 Allen,
(N. B.) 479, 186o; Cazet v. Kirk, 4 Allen, (N. B.) 543, 186o;
Russell v. Russell, I MacArthur, (D. C.) 263, 1874; Windsor
Say. Bk. v. Mcfahon, 38 Fed. Rep. 283, 1889; Lowe v. Bliss,
24 Ill. 168, 186o; Fitzharris v. Leggatt, io Mo. App. 527,
1881; Flagg v. School Dist. No. 70, (N. Dak.) 58 N. W. Rep.
499, 1894; Read v. McNulty, 12 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 445, 186o;
CarrollCo. Say. Bk. v. Strother, 28 S. Car. 504, 1887; contra,
Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 241, 1861 ; Johnson v. Frisbie, 15
Mich. 286, 1867; Hastings v. Thompson, 54 Minn. 184, 1893;
Leggettv.Jones, 10 Wis. 34, 1859.
The same rule applies when a note is payable "with
exchange and costs of collection:" Second Natl. Bk. v.
Basuier, 65 Fed. Rep. 58, 1894; First Nati. Bk. of New
Windsor v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24, 1881.

